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The Original Jurisdiction of the
Ohio Supreme Court
ROBERT L. HAUSSERt
When Maitland' surmised: "The forms of action we have
buried but they still rule us from their graves," he did not
reckon that in Ohio today a few antiquated forms of action are
alive and kicking.
In particular are five writs of quo warranto, mandamus,
procedendo, prohibition, and habeas corpus, which the Consti-
tution of Ohio lodges in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.'
Legislatures have taken great strides in abolishing common
law forms and in devising simpler methods of procedure.3 The
old forms of action are not inherently vicious. Indeed, when
they are abolished, the legislatures often substitute a statutory
proceeding with similar characteristics and identical substantive
rights preserved. Nevertheless, there is advantage in the
change. The common law forms, hoary with age, have become
so steeped in judicial dogma that jurists, in administering the
law, spend more time in maneuvering through procedural by-
paths than in applying the substantive law to reach a just result.
However, when the common law forms are ostensibly abol-
ished, courts are induced to fly above the procedural fog and
into the high strata where the vision is dearer.
The original writs of quo warranto, mandamus, procedendo,
t Member of the Ohio and New York Bars.
' MAITLAND, EQUITY (Chaytor and Whittaker ed., 9I1o), p. vi.
2 OHIO CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, sec. 2.
2 Legislatures, not the courts, have been instrumental in the reform. Thus,
the sweeping procedural reforms in New York and Illinois were the product
of the legislatures. Although today the courts are encouraged by the legisla-
tures to govern procedural matters--cf. the new Federal Rules of Procedure
and the power in the New York Courts to amend rules of practice-the
fossilizing of the above named writs into the Ohio Constitution prevent both
the General Assembly and the courts from taking positive steps in reform,
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prohibition, and habeas corpus, long legally matured, have not
escaped confusing distinctions that terrify the practicing lawyer,
who may invoke the original jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme
Court but once or twice in his entire practice. Should he use
mandamus or procedendo? Should he commence action in the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court? Does Holdsworth in
a footnote preserve a comment that will be raised to defeat
recovery? Why should he commence his quo warranto action
in an inferior court if he can begin immediately in the Supreme
Court? Will he too face the usual judgment: "Mr. Lawyer,
your client deserves some legal relief; but too bad, you have
chosen the wrong writ." Are these writs so steeped in technical
accretions that new simplified procedures are imperative?
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Ordinance of 1787. The Congress of the Confederation, in
framing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, did not specifically
mention the prerogative writs of quo warranto, mandamus,
procedendo, and prohibition.4 Instead, Congress vaguely pro-
vided for the application of common law principles-which
may or may not have included all these writs:
Section 14, Article II. The inhabitants of the said territory shall
always be entitled to the benefits of the writs of habeas corpus, . . .
and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.'
Convention of 1802. The first convention of 1802 in its
final product continued the vague grant of power to the Su-
preme Court:
Article III, Section I. The judicial power of this state, both as to
matter of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court ....
Section 2. . . . [The supreme court] shall have original and
4 Cf. GENERAL CODE OF OHIO (Page's ed., 191o), Vol. IV, p. 51.
5 In 1798 the legislature of the Northwest Territory enacted "that the
comman [sic] law of England, and all statutes in aid thereof, made previous
to the fourth of James I, should be in full force within the Territory." Rep.
Sec'y State (1876) 24. This, of course, gives no specific answer as to the
qxtent to which the prerogative writs were to be in forcq in Ohio,
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appellate jurisdiction, both in common law and in chancery, in such
cases as shall be directed by law . . . .6
Acting under this grant, the legislature from time to time
defined the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, including a lim-
ited original jurisdiction.'
Convention of 1850-51. When the Judiciary Committee
of the Constitutional Convention of i85o reported its delib-
erations, it recommended that the Supreme Court be empow-
ered with definite original jurisdiction in cases of "quo war-
ranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, and procedenda [sic].' The
Committee gave no reason for its enumerating the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and no delegate ever ques-
tioned the wisdom of not permitting the legislature to continue
to define the original jurisdiction. The only suggestion offered
by the delegates was to insert English titles in place of the
Latin, in order to enlighten the lay-delegates what powers
were given to the Court.9 In support of the lay view, Mr.
McCormick proposed "a writ of 'why do you do it'" in place
of quo .,arranto; " 'Do it, damn you'" in place of mandamus;
" 'have his carcass' " in lieu of habeas corpus; and " 'Davy
Crockett'" to supplant p'ocedendo.'° Nevertheless, the new
Constitution, as approved, embodied the four writs in the
Latin."
Convention of 1874. The delegates to the unsuccessful
Constitutional Convention of 1874 likewise raised no complaint
as to the existing original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
although they discussed fully other ways and means to reduce
the overcrowded calendar of that Court."
" GENERAL CODE OF OHIO (Page's ed., 19io), Vol. IV, p. 61.
7 1 Ohio St. (1852), Preface xi.
"Rcport of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the
Rezisioz of the Constitution of the State of Ohio (i85I), Vol. I, p. 585.
Hereafter cited Debates, Convention of 185o-5.
"i Debates, Convention of z850-5z, p. 588.
I. ld. at 590.
I Ohio St. (i85z), Preface xi.
" Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Third Constitu-
tiozal Con :ention of Ohio, 1873 (1874), VoL II, Pt. I, p. 46. Mr. Minor:
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Convention of 1912. Again, the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1912 swallowed the original powers of the Supreme
Court whole, without inquiring whether the writs were neces-
sary or desirable. Without discussion the Convention permitted
Delegate Worthington to add the writ of prohibition, although
Judge Worthington himself admitted that lawyers today "have
very hazy notions . . . as to what a writ of prohibition is"
and that the court had been able to use mandamus to do the
work of prohibition, by ordering a court affirmatively not to
do an act."
It is obvious from the work of the four Conventions that
the five original powers were given to the Supreme Court with
virtually no discussion as to the need for them. The Conven-
tions were too concerned with curing other evils in the judiciary.
And it is probable that the delegates had such "very hazy
notions" as to the scope of the writs that they thought it best
not to tamper with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. At the present time lawyers are no better enlightened
as to this jurisdiction.
Today, nevertheless, we believe that the Constitution
should be concise and clear. The details of enforcing the broad
mandates should be the concern of the legislature and the
courts. Latin terms must not survive successive Constitutions
merely because lawyers have too "hazy notions" of the mean-
ing of the Latin terms safely to eliminate them. At present
we do not believe that appellate courts should be forced to sit
as fact-finding tribunals unless extraordinary circumstances
". .. what should be the jurisdiction . . . of the supreme court . . .? As
to its original jurisdiction, there is no disagreement that I am aware of. The
differences of opinion in the Convention are as to its appellate jurisdiction
See Patterson, The Constitution of Ohio ( 191 z) for subsequent proposals
to amend the Judiciary Article of the Constitution of 1851. None of these
sought to disturb the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
13 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State
of Ohio (1912), Vol. I, p. 1044. Hereafter cited Proceedings and Debates,
Convention of Z912.
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exist. In these respects does the Ohio Constitution require
renovation?
QUO WARRANTO
In reality, the Ohio Supreme Court has but one writ
devoted exclusively to original jurisdiction-that of quo war-
ranto. With the exception of a function of mandamus and of
habeas corpus, the other writs of mandamus, procedendo, pro-
hibition, and habeas corpus do not initiate law suitsi they are
used in conjunction with litigation already begun. These latter
four writs the Supreme Court is empowered to use to regulate
an inferior tribunal before which an action has been commenced.
Early Common Law. The ancient writ of quo warranto
was a prerogative order, issued out of Chancery to enable the
king to enquire whether the possessor of a crown office or
franchise held it rightfully." Although used effectively by
Edward I in his struggle against the rival court systems of the
lords, the writ not only involved cumbersome procedure, but
the decree was conclusive for the future against the crown as
well as the subject.'" The judgment did not involve more than
a seizure of the franchise. 6
In England today. Hence the old writ fell into disuse. In
its place arose the information in the nature of a quo warranto
filed by the Attorney-General. The process upon this is dif-
ferent; and the decree does not bind the government con-
clusively for the future. Not only may the court fine the
usurper, but it can oust him from office as well.' It is probable
that the original Ohio common law incorporated this latter
proceeding of information.'
In Ohio today. When the Constitutional Convention of
185I gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear quo
'4 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1905),
pp. 336-337.
15 I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3 d ed., rewritten, 1922),
pp. 229-230.
163 33 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE, pp. 953-954.
17 2z R.C.L. 656.
1933 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE, p. 953.
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warranto cases, no delegate offered to explain what new power
the writ would give to the Supreme Court that it was not
already exercising by common law and statute. Nor did any
delegate declare whether the General Assembly could there-
after alter the substance of the writ or the cumbersome common
law procedure.
Despite the doubts as to the constitutional power of the
legislature to alter the content of the writ that was set into the
organic law, the legislature has sought to change both the sub-
stance and the procedure. 9 The Ohio Code contains a compre-
hensive list of the substantive rights to be protected by quo
warranto.2 ° More interesting are the statutory changes in pro-
cedure under the writ. The legislature declared quo warranto
to be a civil action 2' and enacted a detailed procedure. But
when the Assembly later established a uniform procedure for
all ordinary civil actions, it neglected to repeal the statutes on
the conduct of quo warranto actions. Hence, the preservation
of the outmoded statutory procedure for quo warranto makes
it all the more difficult today to use the writ. 2 None of the
'" The General Assembly has retained the Statutes despite a dictum in
State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Taylor, z5 Ohio St. 279 (1874), that the
proceedings in quo warranto "is not governed by the code, and the pleadings
are to be made up as at common law." But in another dictum in State ex rel.
Price v. Columbus, D. & M. Electric Co., 104 Ohio St. 120, 136 N.E. 59
(1922), the Supreme Court followed a procedural rule set up by General
Code sec. 12315.
20 For example, by General Code sec. 123o3 a civil action may be brought
in the name of the State: (i) against a person who unlawfully holds public
office, civil or military, or a franchise within this State, or an office in a
domestic corporation; (?) against a public officer, civil or military, who
suffers an act which, by law, operates as a forfeiture of his office; or (3)
against an association of persons who act as a corporation without being legally
incorporated. (4) Section 12304 authorizes a civil action to be brought in
the name of the State against a corporation: (a) when it has violated a pro-
vision of an act for its creation, or any amendment of such act; (b) when
it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by non-user; (c) when it has
committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender of its corporate
rights and franchises; or (d) when it has exercised a franchise or right in
contravention of law.
21 OHIO GENERAL CODE, secs. 12303, 12304.
22 For example, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, quo warranto is
brought in the name of the State (General Code secs. 12303, 12304) upon
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steps indicated in the footnotes are an improvement on the
uniform procedure now in use in Ohio for ordinary civil actions.
Is it desirable that the Ohio Supreme Court continue its
original jurisdiction in quo warranto? (i) The framers of the
Ohio Constitution assigned no reason for giving this jurisdic-
tion. (2) Nor is it indispensable to the integrity of the State:
the New York Court of Appeals, for example, does not exercise
such original power. (3) And the above statutory attempts to
regulate the constitutional quo warranto powers of the appellate
courts have made use of the writ confusing, not only because
the statutory procedure is different from the uniform procedure
in other civil actions, but also because the Supreme Court has
not yet held whether the Assembly can define the rights and
remedies of constitutional quo warranto.
(4) Of course, in 1851 (the Constitution of 1851 was first
to give the Supreme Court this express power) it was not
unthinkable to vest the Court with such jurisdiction. For, prior
relation of the Attorney-General or a prosecuting attorney (section 12307)
or by one who is entitled to the office held by the usurper (section 12307),
or in lieu of a prosecuting attorney by a member of the bar appointed by a
judge (section I23O9). By section 12305 the Governor, Supreme Court,
or General Assembly may direct the Attorney-General or prosecuting attorney
to commence action.
Action can be brought only in the Supreme Court, or in a Court of
Appeals of the county where one of the defendants resides, or in the Court
of Appeals of Franklin County, where the Attorney-General may file the
petition.
Sections 12312 and 12313 prescribe alternate ways to commence suit.
(i) The relator may apply for leave to file a petition, and the Court may
notify the defendant and hear his argument to the motion, before the Court
grants the leave. If the leave is granted, the Court shall endorse the fact on
the petition, which shall be filed. Or (z) the petition can be filed without
leave and notice, and a summons shall be served as in ordinary civil actions.
Service by publication consists of a notice for four consecutive weeks in a
newspaper in the defendant's county (section 12314). Thirty days are
allowed between each further pleading (section 12315), which may consist
of defendant's demurrer or answer, and plaintiff's demurrer or reply. Curi-
ously, although the Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 4, permits the General Assembly
to invest the Common Pleas with original jurisdiction in quo warranto, the
legislature has not done so. Instead, it has authorized the Supreme Court
or a Court of Appeals (section 12326) to remand its cases in which cor-
porations are sought to be dissolved to the local Common Pleas for further
proceedings.
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to that time the justices had been travelling through the
counties, as "stirrup judges," and sitting in original proceedings
of "important" cases;2" quo warranto actions were sometimes
important cases.
But today most lawyers oppose the practice of initiating
law suits before the Supreme Court, except in unusual circum-
stances. Rather, they believe that the highest appellate court
should confine itself to questions of law that have arisen in the
lower tribunals. The determination of issues of fact should be
reserved for trial judges in the vicinage, where the local condi-
tions coloring the facts can be discovered most easily. Ohio
Supreme Court judges now save their stirruping for election
months.
(5) Anyway, original proceedings before the Supreme
Court in quo warranto have been unnecessary. Since 1803 the
Supreme Court has heard no fewer than 163 such actions. Of
these, in12 were commenced in the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court; the others came by error or, since i936,
appeal. This plural bench of high-salaried members spent
many days resolving issues of fact that could probably have
been better determined by a single trial judge. The writer has
found no case where it was necessary that the action be origi-
nated in the Supreme Court. The quo warranto actions that
have originated in the Supreme Court have involved no greater
political or social issues nor sums of money than have many
of the ordinary civil actions commenced in the Common Pleas.
Probably the proceedings to liquidate the Standard Oil Com-
pany of Ohio in 1892 2 was the outstanding of all quo warranto
actions commenced in the Ohio Supreme Court; a more typical
case, however, is a quo warranto proceeding to oust a member
from a board of health.25 But even a rare case like the Standard
23 1 Ohio St. (1852), Preface xi.
24 State ex rel. Watson v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E.
z79, 15 L.R.A. 145, 34 Am. St. Rep. 541 (89z).
25 State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Craig, 69 Ohio St. 236, 69 N.E.
228 (903).
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Oil Company proceeding does not today justify the determina-
tion of facts by the seven judges; a trial judge of the Common
Pleas might just as competently make findings of fact-and
dispose of issues of law as well. In the writer's opinion, had all
the quo warranto cases been commenced in the Common Pleas,
very few would have involved legal issues important enough
to have reached the Supreme Court for review. The Ohio
Supreme Court has not always boasted such a free calendar
that it could assist the nisi prius judges.
(6) To allow dual jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals enables the relator a choice of at least
two courts to commence suit. Naturally, he will use this
advantage for self-serving ends: to find a set of judges who
will be more sympathetic to his cause, or to lay venue in a
court distant from defendant's witnesses.
(7) Probably the trickiest use of an original quo warranto
action before the Supreme Court will be in testing the consti-
tutionality of a statute. Follow closely.
By the Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2, the Supreme Court has
but limited power to declare statutes invalid:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except
in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law
unconstitutional and void."
This constitutional limitation can affect a quo warranto
proceeding in three situations when quo warranto is used to
test the validity of a statute. (a) Suppose that such a quo war-
ranto action is begun in a Court of Appeals. In its decision the
Court of Appeals declares the statute invalid. The Supreme
Court may either affirm or reverse the judgment by a bare
majority of four members." (b) Suppose that the Court of
Appeals has ruled the statute constitutional. Upon the appeal
"' Adopted Sept. 3, 19 1.
'7 The decision of the lower court will be affirmed when the vote of the
Supreme Court is split, three-to-three. Cf. Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co.,
105 Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426 (i92).
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of the case, the Supreme Court may affirm this decision by a
simple majority of four judges. But for the Supreme Court
to declare the law unconstitutional on this appeal there must
be a concurrence of at least six judges5 even if the Supreme
Court votes five-to-two to reverse the award of the Court of
Appeals, the statute must be held constitutional and the decision
of the lower court affirmed.2" (c) Likewise, if the quo war-
ranto proceeding originates in the Supreme Court, the Court
may uphold the validity of a statute involved by a simple
majority of the judges5 yet to declare the act void would
require a concurrence of at least six of the judges.
Hence, if a relator bases his claim upon a statute which is
likely to be declared unconstitutional, he should by all means
commence his quo warranto proceeding in the Supreme Court,
since the statute will fall only if six judges agree to invalidate
it. But if a relator seeks to have the statute declared void, he
should start proceedings in a Court of Appeals, because the
Supreme Court, by a simple majority of four judges, can
affirm a decision of the Court of Appeals holding the statute to
be unconstitutional.
The use of the device is not remote. On at least eighteen
occasions the quo warranto writ has been used to test the val-
idity of a statute.29 Four such cases have arisen since the
28 cf. Barker v. City of Akron, 98 Ohio St. 446, izI N.E. 646 (1918).
2" State ex el. Meacham v. Preston, 126 Ohio St. i, 183 N.E. 777
(193z); State ex rel. Symons v. Rice, 96 Ohio St. 574, 117 N.E. 893
(I917); State ex rel. Pogue v. Groom, 91 Ohio St. i, io9 N.E. 477
(914); State ex rel. Ach v. Evans, 90 Ohio St. 243, 107 N.E. 537 (1914);
State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Capital City Dairy Co., 6z Ohio St. 350,
57 N.E. 62 (i9oo); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Brown, 6o Ohio St.
499, 54 N.E. 467 (1899); State ex rel. Wilmot v. Buckley, 6o Ohio St.
273, 54 N.E. 272 (I899); Mason v. State ex reil. McCoy, 58 Ohio St. 30,
5o N.E. 6 (1898); State ex rel. Richards v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419,
4o N.E. 508 (1895); Street Railway Co. v. Street Railway Co., 50 Ohio
St. 603, 36 N.E. 32 (1893); State ex rel. Wasson v. Taylor, 50 Ohio St.
I2o, 38 N.E. 24 (893); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hudson, 44.
Ohio St. 137, 5 N.E. zz8 (1886); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Haw-
kins, 44 Ohio St. 98 (1886); State ex tel. Attorney-General v. City of
Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 445 (872); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Sher-
man, zz Ohio St. 411 (87z); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. City of
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adoption of Art. IV, Sec. 2 in 191 2. Those lawyers who do
not believe that the power of the Supreme Court to declare
laws invalid should be shackled might favor an indirect attack
on the present restriction by working to abolish the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in quo warranto5 this would
eliminate one situation wherein the Supreme Court is now able
to invalidate a statute only by an abnormal majority.
The above factors, it is believed, justify the abolition of
the Supreme Court to hear quo warranto actions in the first
instance. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
quo warranto should be stricken from the Constitution. In the
place of the Constitutional grant, the legislature should
empower the Common Pleas to hear quo warranto, so that
the Supreme Court would be limited to hearing appeals on
issues of law. The procedure to be followed should be that
of an ordinary civil action. This would reduce the cost of the
court system, simplify the Constitution, and possibly further
justice.
ORIGINAL WRITS WITH APPELLATE FUNCTIONS
The remaining original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in mandamus, procedendo, prohibition and habeas corpus (with
the exception of a few phases of mandamus and habeas corpus)
serves as steps in the appeal of litigation already commenced
in inferior courts. These remedies grew in the common law as
aids to the writs of appeal, error, and certiorari.
Certiorari and error were writs to appeal a case after the
judgment had been rendered in the court below. It was often
so difficult for a lawyer to decide when to use certiorari and
when to use error that he might as well toss a coin. Yet the
client might lose his cause of action if the attorney selected
Cincinnati, 2o Ohio St. IS (1870); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Ken-
non, 7 Ohio St. 546 (1857); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Neibling, 6
Ohio St. 40 (1856).
"I All four cases were original proceedings in the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. And in all four, the votes of the Supreme Court have
been unanimous.
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certiorari instead of error, or vice versa. Hence, upon the
recommendation of the Ohio Judicial Council, the legislature
has consolidated certiorari and error into the single appeal.3'
On the other hand, mandamus, procedendo, prohibition
and habeas corpus are historical writs for use in appealing liti-
gation before judgment has been reached in the subordinate
tribunal. Professor Sunderland points out the equal confusion,
and costly results, attendant upon the choice of these writs:
The volume of litigation which has involved the scope, purpose and
proper limitations of these various appellate remedies has been appalling.
I venture to say that the forms of action at common law never
approached these forms of appeal in these burdensome consequences.
Our appellate practice has become such a perpetual source of litigation
in practically all our states, that Corpus Juris devotes more space to
Appeal and Error than to any other subject in the law. The confusion
which baffles the ingenuity of counsel could not be better demonstrated
than by the admission of the appellate courts themselves that in case of
doubt between two methods of appeal it would be prudent to use
both . . ..
The discussion that follows of the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, and
habeas corpus is intended to reveal the confusion surrounding
these writs that today make them unworkable. The writer
believes that the reform suggested by Professor Sunderland is
still needed-that these writs be repealed from the Constitu-
tion and that there be substituted "a single form of appeal,
consisting of a simple notice.""3 Ohio has adopted the reform
in part by supplanting certiorari and error with the simple
notice ("appeal"). Ohio should go the whole way.
31 GENERAL CODE sec. 12223-46 abolished writs of error and certiorari
in civil cases. Section 12223-1 defines the new single "appeal" as the means
of reviewing civil cases.
32 Sunderland, Simplification of Appellate Procedure (1929), 3 U. OF
CIN. L. REV. I, at p. 5.
33 Sunderland, op. cit. supra, n. 32, at p. 6.
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MANDAMUS
Since the lay-delegates at the Convention of 1851 had
little idea of the meaning of mandamus in the common law,
and since it nowhere appears from the Proceedings that the
lawyer-delegates made any attempt to enlighten the laymen,
the Supreme Court was free to decide for itself the scope of
its power in mandamus. Two functions have been recognized.
(I) The Court has received petitions for mandamus to com-
mence litigation in the Supreme Court even though no steps
were first taken in a lower tribunal. (2) And the Supreme
Court has permitted mandamus in the appeal of cases pending
in the lower tribunals.
To Initiate Litigation. The ancient prerogative of man-
damus first took form as a letter to the king to seek his aid in
ordering a royal officer to do his duty. As the monarch side-
stepped his judicial tasks, the King's Bench assumed the duty
of issuing the decrees. It was in the discretion of the judges
whether or not to award mandamus, so that the practice has
now arisen that the writ will issue only where the petitioner
has no other adequate remedy.
The Ohio legislature had empowered the Supreme Court
to grant mandamus in the very first Act to organize the
judiciary in 18o3."4 The Court sought to apply the common
law uses. And the legislature has enacted a definition of its
own:
Mandamus is a writ issued, in the name of the state, to an inferior
tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. 35
Thus, if an official or a layman who has been charged with
some duty by common law or by statute refuses to execute his
duty, an aggrieved party may go either to the Supreme Court,
to a Court of Appeals, or to a Common Pleas to compel the
'1 Act of April 15, 18o3, I Chase 356.
35 OHIO GENERAL CODE, sec. I 2283.
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public agent to execute the function. If the petitioner satisfies
the requirements of the writ, the Supreme Court cannot decline
to hear the case on the ground that he could have obtained the
same relief in mandamus in a lower court or because the con-
troversy is too insignificant to require the attention of seven
appellate judges-since the Constitution now commands:
No law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be
prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court."
There have been a few original mandamus actions before
the judges of the Supreme Court that have warranted such
distinguished trial masters. For example, in State ex rel.
American Union Telegraph Co. v. Bell Telephone Co., " the
Court was petitioned to determine the right of the public to
subscribe for the services of public utilities. In order to gag
the competition of the rival American Union Telegraph Com-
pany, the Western Union contracted with the Columbus Tele-
phone Company for telephone services and for the stipulation
that the Telephone Company would not install any phones in
the office of any rival company. The American Union peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to compel the Telephone Company
to install phone service; and the Court granted relief in man-
damus because it found the statutory duty of a public telephone
utility to be to furnish service to all subscribers willing to pay.
But most of the cases are far short of such social importance.
Typical is the petition in State ex rel. Walton v. Crabbe," in
which an attorney retained by the department of welfare sought
a writ from the Supreme Court to force the Attorney-General
to issue a pay voucher. The legal problems were as insignificant
as the compensation involved, and the Common Pleas or the
Court of Appeals of Franklin County might have handled the
case just as efficiently.
The continuance of the duty upon the Supreme Court to
36 OHIO CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, sec. 2.
37 36 Ohio St. 296 (I88o).
38 io9 Ohio St. 623, 143 N.E. 189 (1924).
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hear these original mandamus actions is at best an annoying
luxury." The petitioner has a selection of three courts in which
to commence action, and his choice will usually be determined
by which set of judges will probably hear his case most favor-
ably. We are tolerating a trial court of seven judges, each of
whom receives four times the amount of salary of a judge of
the Common Pleas in many counties." There is but one con-
clusion: the constitutional duty of the Supreme Court to hear
original actions in mandamus should be abolished. The peti-
tioner should be limited to the lower courts in commencing his
litigation; the Supreme Court should hear only appeals on
issues of law.
As an Appellate Writ. Mandamus is the writ designed to
compel any public officer to do his duty. Therefore the writ
should issue against any judge to order him to sit in trial of
a case and proceed to judgment where he is instructed to do
so by common law or statute. If a judge or presiding officer
of a lower tribunal refuses to hear an action because he errone-
ously believes that he has no jurisdiction over the case, or if
he refuses to proceed to judgment because he has erroneously
accepted some reason to stop the suit, the aggrieved party can
petition the Supreme Court to order the judge below to go
ahead with the case. In hearing this petition the Supreme
Court must decide whether the inferior court did have juris-
diction, or whether the reason assigned by the judge for refus-
ing to proceed to judgment is invalid. And in making this
decision the Supreme Court is reviewing a point of law decided
by the inferior tribunal; thus it can be said that mandamus has
the function of an appellate writ.
To illustrate. In Matter of James Turner,4 an indictment
" Of more than 174 proceedings in mandamus heard by the Ohio Su-
preme Court, no fewer than 137 were commenced in its original jurisdiction.
4 0 OHIO GENERAL CODE, sec. 2z 5 I: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
$1z,5oo; associate judge, $iz,ooo; judge of Common Pleas, $3,000 to
$12,000.
4' 5 Ohio 54z (832).
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for murder was returned against Turner in the Common Pleas
of Fairfield County. The judge observed that an indictment
against the accused for the same offense had been presented to
the Supreme Court (which acted as a trial court while on circuit
before 1851). The judge asked Turner to elect in which court
he desired to be tried. Turner stood mute. Thereupon the
Common Pleas judge refused to proceed with the trial because
the similar indictment was still pending before the Supreme
Court. The prosecuting attorney then petitioned the Supreme
Court to issue a writ of mandamus to order the judge of the
Common Pleas to take jurisdiction. The writ did issue, for the
Supreme Court found that mandamus applies "to compel
courts to do that justice which the law enjoins them to admin-
ister,"4 2 even though it will not constrain the judge "to act in
a particular manner," nor to "prescribe what judgment to
give.
43
There are two strong limitations on the use of mandamus
as an appellate writ. First, the writ will issue only where the
inferior tribunal has not yet rendered a judgment. If a judg-
ment has been given, no matter how obviously erroneous,
mandamus will not issue to compel the lower court to change
it, since the aggrieved party has adequate remedy to gain a
reversal by ordinary error proceedings.4" Second, although the
Supreme Court may order the inferior tribunal to act, it will
not compel it to act in any special way or to reach any particu-
lar conclusion. For example, where a probate judge is willing
to proceed with a controversy to a final award, the Supreme
Court will not intervene with mandamus to force him to con-
strue a statute in any particular way 4' the aggrieved party must
wait until the probate judge renders judgment, and then
attack that judgment by ordinary appeal.
42 Id. at 543.
43 Id. at 544.
44 State ex rel. Schunk v. Hamilton, 127 Ohio St. 555, 19o N.E. ig
('933).
45 State ex rel. Stansberger v. Lamneck, 128 Ohio St. 35, I9O N.E. 14z
(934).
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Shall the Supreme Court continue its power to use man-
damus as an appellate writ? (I) Practice under the writ has
become extremely confusing. In General Code sections 12283 to
12302 the legislature has sought to define the substance of the
writ, as well as procedure. But since the power in mandamus
has been created by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
said that as to the substantive scope of mandamus, "it is not in
the power of the legislature either to add to or take from it";"
and as to procedure, "the statute is not in any event conclusive
upon this subject."47 In future cases, will the Supreme Court
follow the dictates of the Code, or will it deviate in favor of
a common law rule?
M\andamus is said to be a discretionary writ4" and will issue
only when the Court is sure that the relator has no other
adequate remedy. " But since the Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2,
enjoins the Supreme Court from making any rule "whereby
any person shall be prevented from invoking the original juris-
diction of the supreme court," can the Court exercise any
discretion in granting or denying the writ when the relator
establishes a right to relief?
The demarcation between the right to have mandamus and
the necessity to recur to the ordinary error proceedings is not
clear. M\andamus will issue only before the lower court has
made a final decision; mandamus can never be used to specify
how a subordinate tribunal shall act; a relator may not have
the writ where any other adequate remedy is available to him.
But there is doubt as to when a tribunal has made a final
decision, or whether the relator has another adequate remedy.
If a lower court has assumed jurisdiction, but is dilatory in
proceeding although the relator is meanwhile put to serious
4', State ex rel. Moyer v. Baldwin, 77 Ohio St. 532 at538, 83 N.E. 907,
19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49, I2 Ann. Cas. io (19o8).
4 State ex rel. Cope v. Cooper, izi Ohio St. 519 at 521, 169 N.E. 701,
8 Ohio L. Abs. 63 (1930).
-t" 25 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE, 975-
41' State ex rel. Cope v. Cooper, 121 Ohio St. 519, 169 N.E. 701, 8 Ohio
L. Abs. 63 (1930).
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hardship, will the Supreme Court issue mandamus to order
the lower court to hurry?" Of course, the relator will find out
whether mandamus will issue when the Supreme Court renders
its decree. But that's not administering lawi it's gambling.
Moreover, the relator may be held to have lost his right of
appeal because he has chosen the wrong writ.5
(2) Mandamus may be subject to a tricky device in the
testing of the validity of statutes. Such may be the result of
the Constitutional limitation which restricts the power of the
Supreme Court in declaring laws void to instances where six of
the seven judges concur, except that a simple majority of four
judges can affirm a decision of a Court of Appeals declaring a
law unconstitutional.52
Suppose that a Common Pleas court refuses to proceed in
determining a case solely because the judge believes the statute
on which the plaintiff 'relies for his relief is invalid. By the Con-
stitution 3 the aggrieved party has an opportunity to seek man-
damus from either a Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
to test the validity of the statute that the Common Pleas refuses
to enforce. (a) If the relator petitions a Court of Appeals, and
if this Court should hold the law unconstitutional, then the
Supreme Court could affirm the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals by a simple majority of four judges. (b) On the other
hand, if the relator petitions the Supreme Court in the first
ifistance, it would take a concurrence of six judges to hold the
statute invalid and thereby refuse a writ of mandamus. Obvi-
ously, if the relator depends on the validity of a statute to gain
relief, the sensible thing for him to do is to seek mandamus
immediately from the Supreme Court.
" Cf. the relator's predicament in State ex rel. Schunk v. Hamilton, 127
Ohio St. 555, 19o N.E. 199 (1933), where the Court of Appeals had assumed
jurisdiction of an appeal but was postponing final judgment.
" For example, consider the petitioner's plight in Shelby v. Hoffman, 7
Ohio St. 45o (1857).
52 OHIO CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, sec. 2. For a more complete discussion,
see Hausser, Limiting the Voting Power of the Supreme Court: Procedure in
the States (1938) 5 OH-IO ST. L.J. 54.
-1 Art. IV, secs. 2, 6.
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Such tactics have been used in Ohio. In State ex rel.
TVilliams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,4 the relator,
an injured employee, invoked the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in mandamus to compel the Industrial Com-
mission to compensate the relator from its surplus fund because
the employer was insolvent. General Code sec. I465-75"
orders such payments from a fund (raised from premiums paid
by solvent employers) when the employer of the injured party
is insolvent. Because three judges could find no constitutional
objection to the act, a writ had to be granted, even though four
members of the Court believed that the statute violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Counsel for the relator were wise in commencing the action
in the Supreme Court. For, if the case had originated in a
Court of Appeals unsympathetic to the statute, then, on appeal
to the high tribunal, the four dissenting judges above could
have controlled the decision and hence denied relief. 6
The attendant evils of mandamus, as described above, jus-
tify the total abolition of the power of the Supreme Court to
issue mandamus. Instead, the Constitution should be amended
so as to empower the Assembly to regulate procedure on appeal.
Then the legislature should rephrase the uniform statutory
appeal (now in General Code secs. 12293-I et. seq.) to include
an appeal to order an inferior tribunal to proceed before it has
rendered a judgment. No longer would a litigant run the risk
of losing all right of appeal because he chose mandamus instead
of appeal. The Supreme Court could discuss the substantive
rights instead of wrangling with the procedural intricacies of
a prerogative writ. The appellant's lawyer would not then
have a choice of appellate courts through which to obtain a
more favorable decision on the constitutionality of a statute.
r I16 Ohio St. 45, 156 N.E. ioi (i9z7).
As amended March 26, 1925.
, This ame strategy proved successful in State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith,
ioz Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (92), and in State ex rel. Jonzes v,
Zae 7 . 507, 59 N.E. 564 (927).
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PROCEDENDO
Procedendo is another common law writ that the Conven-
tion of i85i fossilized into the present Constitution. The
Supreme Court had used this writ years before 185i" without
the aid of any express constitutional authority. And when the
Judiciary Committee of the Convention of 1851 proposed that
the Supreme Court be expressly empowered to issue writs of
procedendo, the lay delegates were too browbeaten by the Latin
terminology to question the necessity for its inclusion. Proce-
dendo has continued to browbeat lawyers too.
Pollock and Maitland," and Holdsworth,0 in their stand-
ard treatises on the.English law, did not consider this writ of
sufficient importance to describe its operation.
Technically, procedendo is a writ issued in an action that
has previously been removed from an inferior court to a supe-
rior court by habeas corpus, certiorari, or writ of privilege, and
where
It does not appear to such superior court that the suggestion upon
which the cause has been removed is sufficiently proved; in which case
the superior court by this writ remits the cause to the court from whence
it came, commanding the inferior court to proceed to the final hearing
and determination of the same."0
In simpler terms, when an inferior court has without justifica-
tion refused to take jurisdiction of a case, or to prosecute a case
to judgment, the aggrieved party may apply to the Supreme
Court to issue the writ of procedendo to direct the inferior court
to take charge of the action and proceed to judgment. But if
the lower court has already rendered judgment, the petition
for a writ of procedendo cannot be used to bring the case to the
attention of the Supreme Court-because such a heresy would
invade the scope of the appellate writs of certiorari, error and
appeal.
57 Cf. In the Matter of Samuel Kazer, 5 Ohio 544 (1832).
58 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed., I9oI).
5 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1927).
60 z BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's 3d rev.), p. 2729.
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Procedendo, then, is not an original writ in the sense of
giving a plaintiff the right to initiate his litigation in the
Supreme Court. Rather, the litigants first must have attempted
to gain relief from an inferior court. Only when the lower
court has refused to render a judgment will the Supreme Court
use its "original jurisdiction" in procedendo.6'
The untutored law clerk will now ask: "In these cases, the
Supreme Court orders the lower court to take some affirmative
step. Why does not mandamus fill the need just as well? How
will I know when to use procedendo and not mandamus?"
The Supreme Court sought to supply a distinction between
procedendo and mandamus in Matter of Samuel Kazer.62
Samuel Kazer had been tried and convicted of arson in the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Upon a writ
of error, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
ordered a new trial. But since the journal entry of the Supreme
Court ordered only the keeper of the penitentiary to return the
prisoner to the sheriff-and did not specifically order the Court
of Common Pleas to retry the case-the trial judge refused to
proceed because he did not believe that he had jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court then issued procedendo to compel the trial judge
to act. According to the Supreme Court, mandamus might be
issued to the Common Pleas judge; "but as a peremptory
mandamus is not ordered in these cases in the first instance, we
believe the ends of justice will be attended with equal certainty
and more speed by procedendo. 63
But the Supreme Court did not explain why procedendo
compels greater speed and certainty than mandamus.
The Supreme Court did finally admit that mandamus is
equally as efficient, in State ex rel. Smith v. Smith.6" Here the
relator, a state milk inspector, petitioned the Supreme Court to
exercise its original jurisdiction in mandamus to compel the
,; Cf. Matter of Samuel Kazer, 5 Ohio 544 (1832).
' Ibid.
Id. at 545.
'4 69 Ohio St. 196, 68 N.E. 1044 (1903).
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defendant, a justice of the peace, to proceed with a misde-
meanor prosecution against one Townsley, without the inter-
vention of a jury. The magistrate had doubted his jurisdiction
to proceed with the case except by the use of a jury. The
Supreme Court thought otherwise, and issued mandamus to
order the justice of the peace to hear the prosecution. Shauck,
J. explained that mandamus could be used instead of proce-
dendo:
Formerly the writ of procedendo ad judicium was awarded by a
court of superior jurisdiction to compel an inferior tribunal to proceed
in cases where it refused to act because doubtful of its jurisdiction, or
satisfied that it had none. It was, in substance, a writ, of mandamus
though having a peculiar name because of its office in the particular
case. But in modern practice the distinction in name has disappeared
and mandamus is allowed, not to control discretion, but to compel its
exercise."
In other words, procedendo may be dropped from the Consti-
tution because its function is adequately served by the more
inclusive writ of mandamus. And the writer has already recom-
mended the elimination of mandamus in favor of a more
extended operation of the statutory appeal. 6
Indeed, so long as procedendo continues in the Constitu-
tion, it is a pitfall into which the litigant may lose his sub-
stantive rights, solely because he has erroneously chosen this
method of appeal instead of another. This danger lurked in
State ex rel. Barnes v. Marsh." The relatrix had petitioned
the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to issue man-
damus or procedendo to compel judges in the courts below to
expunge certain judgments rendered against the relatrix. The
Supreme Court refused this relief, since when a case has reached
the judgment-stage, the proper method to attack a judgment
(that is regular on its face) is by error proceedings, not man-
damus or procedendo:
65 69 Ohio St. 196, at p. 201.
66 In the past few years, the only petition for a writ of procedendo from
the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction has been State ex rel. Davey v.
Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, Io Ohio Op. 102 (1937).
67 120 Ohio St. 222, 165 N.E. 843 (1929).
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Plaintiff has a misconception of the province of a suit in mandamus
as well as of the province of a suit in procedendo. Such suits cannot
be made the instrumentality of review."
PROHIBITION
Prohibition is another common law writ that enables the
litigant to appeal his case to the Ohio Supreme Court before
the subordinate tribunal has rendered judgment. It is prob-
able that the Supreme Court made no use at all of this writ
before 19 13. No Constitutional Convention before that of 1912
discussed the need for it. But in 1912 the influential delegate
Judge Worthington proposed to include the writ of prohibition
as one of the original jurisdictions of the Supreme Court. The
following is the discussion of the writ of prohibition in the
Convention of 1912, which caused the writ to be inserted into
the present Constitution:
Mr. Vorthington: . . . There will be some lawyers here who
have not looked at their Blackstone for some years, and who may have
very hazy notions in their own minds as to what a writ of prohibition is.
It is a writ that is used by the higher court in ordinary parlance to keep
an inferior court within the limits of the jurisdiction that the law pre-
scribes for it. It is a short cut to tell the inferior court to mind its own
business and not attempt to do something that the law does not authorize
it to do. It was a writ that was exercised by the court of King's Bench
in England, and that was brought over to all the courts of last resort
in this country. I believe it was possible to have been exercised by the
supreme court under the constitution of 1802 in Ohio, but was made
impossible in the constitution of 1851. Why the change was made I
do not know.
[Worthington referred to a case (He did not remember the cita-
tion.) wherein a trial judge was probably exceeding his powers. To
stop him, and since there was no writ of prohibition in the Ohio Supreme
Court or the Circuit Courts] . . . the lawyers tortured . . . the writ
of mandamus with the writ of injunction into a writ of prohibition,
1 2o Ohio St. 222, at p. 224. The Supreme Court generously allowed
the relatrix thirty days in which to amend her petition. But the amended
petition failed to bring relief, in State ex rel. Barnes v. Marsh, I2I Ohio St.
32I, x68 N.E. 473 (i929), and State ex rel. Barnes v. Marsh, 121 Ohio St.477 (19z9).
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and we had that sort of thing going on in the courts of Hamilton
County which accomplished exactly the same result of what they thought
was a mandamus to compel the judge not to do what he was going to
do, and they coupled that with a prayer for injunction. To a lawyer
who was brought up in the old school such a thing would have caused
I don't know how much mental trouble. I was not brought up under
the old school, but I was near enough to it to remember how those who
were the leaders when I was young at the bar would have looked at a
matter of that kind. I cannot conceive any possible harm that the
granting of the power to issue that writ to the supreme court would
give and I can see that it might prevent a great deal of trouble."9
Prohibition at Common Law. Prohibition is a prerogative
writ issued by a superior court and directed to an inferior tri-
bunal, or to an "inferior ministerial tribunal possessing inci-
dental judicial powers and known as a quasi judicial tribunal;
or even in extreme cases, to a purely ministerial body, com-
manding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions." It
attempts to stop an inferior court or tribunal "from usurping
jurisdiction with which it is not legally invested.""0
First used by the Crown as a weapon to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the Ecclesiastical Courts,71 the writ of prohibition is now
used by a lay superior court against a secular inferior court. It
does not settle a case on its merits, but merely stops a lower
court from doing so. It is similar to injunction in that both stop
proceedings; but injunction is directed against the litigants,
whereas prohibition is a command against the court itself.
Defects of the writ in Ohio. (i) Although the Ohio courts
commenced their use of prohibition only in 1913, a penumbra
of judicial fog already beclouds the practice under the remedy.
It has taken costly litigation to instruct Ohio lawyers that pro-
hibition will not issue where the relator could have pursued an
adequate remedy at law."' And that prohibition is not a substi-
69 I Proceedings and Debates, ConVentio of X912 (1912), p. 104,4.
70 32 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE, "Prohibition," sec. z.
71 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.,
19O1), p. 665.
72State ex rel. Wade v. Kinkead, 113 Ohio St. 487, 149 N.E. 697
(1925).
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tute for writ of error therefore prohibition will not lie if the
lower court has rendered a judgment. 3 And that prohibition
issues to restrain a court from exercising powers of jurisdiction
which it does not have, but will not issue where a court, having
competent jurisdiction, is about to issue an erroneous judg-
ment.7" And that prohibition issues as of right, not by discretion
of the Court." Additional academic refinements have been the
by-product of forty-four other proceedings commenced in the
Supreme Court alone.
(2) The right of a litigant to invoke the original jurisdic-
tion in prohibition produces an undesirable method of testing
the constitutionality of a statute, similar to that discussed above
in the consideration of mandamus. This strategy has not as yet
been employed, but it might well be attempted in testing such
statutes as delegate unconstitutional powers to the courts of
common pleas, probate courts, justices of the peace, municipal
courts, or administrative tribunals exercising judicial powers.
The confusion in administering the writ of prohibition,
together with its possible abuse in the testing of the validity
of a statute, warrants the repeal of the writ from the Consti-
tution. In its place, the legislature should extend the existing
unitary statutory appeal7 to include a fourth category in addi-
tion to the third category advocated in the previous discussion
of mandamus: (d) appeal before judgment to prohibit further
proceedings in the inferior tribunal. The legislature could then
make further changes as the needs arise, without the necessity
for constitutional amendments. And the Supreme Court could
not dismiss the appeal because the appellant had chosen the
wrong writ. These reforms suggested under the discussions of
Mandamus and Prohibition would enlarge the power of the
7 Ibid.
71 State ex rel. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Duffy et al., Industrial
Commission of Ohio, i i. Ohio St. 702, 5z N.E. 656 (19z6).
7'State ex rel. Garrison v. Brough, 94 Ohio St. 115, 113 N.E. 683
(1916).
76 OHIO GENERAL CODE, sec. 12223-I, which now has two categories:
(a) appeal on questions of law, (b) appeal on questions of law and fact.
52 LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1940
appellate courts to hear appeals in many cases before a final
order has been granted. It would still not permit appeals from
any intermediate order, as is allowed today in New York.
HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas corpus-a prerogative writ so hallowed by the lay-
man that legislators would reflect twice before proposing any
substitute. And being an historical writ, habeas corpus is now
so shrouded in judicial fog that the lawyer shies away. As a
result, the layman and the lawyer are on a par: both revere
the writ because of its mystery. Nevertheless, it is high time
someone peeks up to discover whether we are not worshipping
an idol.
As an original writ. In general, habeas corpus is a writ
directed to the person detaining another and commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place,
with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do,
submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding
the writ shall consider in that behalf. It seeks to protect one's
personal liberty from unlawful restraint.
In Ohio habeas corpus has two procedural functions. (i) It
may be the object of an ordinary civil action to free a person
restrained by a defendant who has not claimed to have the right
to do so by reason of any judicial proceeding. Thus, a person
claiming the right to custody of children may have habeas
corpus against one who is allegedly holding the minors unlaw-
fully." The writ will issue in favor of a parent to secure the
release of a minor son from state military service where the
son has misrepresented his age and has enlisted without his
parent's consent."' And when a sane person is confined in an
insane asylum, the court must grant habeas corpus.T
The Supreme Court has been expressly empowered with
this original jurisdiction in habeas corpus since 1851. Indeed,
77 Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299 (1877).
7 8 Re Kutchta, 81 Ohio St. 508, 91 N.E. 113z (1909).
79 Re Gunning, 14 Ohio C.C. 507, 7 Ohio C.D. 443 (1897).
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the Constitutional amendment of 1913 forbade the Supreme
Court to pawn off this jurisdiction-by stipulating that:
no law shall be passed nor rule made whereby any person shall be pre-
vented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court."0
In 1851 it was not unreasonable to give the judges of the
Supreme Court this original power, because at that time they
were "stirrup justices" and heard all important trials in the
first instance. Moreover, since the number of judges in Ohio
was small, it was important that every one of them have power
to issue that great protective remedy.
Disadvantages of the Original Power in the Supreme Court.
But today the Supreme Court sits only at Columbus, where a
Court of Appeals, a Court of Common Pleas, and a Probate
Court all meet and can issue the writ with the same effectiveness
as the Supreme Court. There are now enough local judges in
Ohio to make the writ easily available everywhere. A proceed-
ing in habeas corpus may involve laborious factual controversies.
Hence, it may be that today the hearing of habeas corpus actions
as a writ to initiate a litigation should be confined to inferior
tribunals. On the other hand, the writ may still be so valuable
a remedy that every judge except the police judges should
continue to have power to issue it. The Ohio Judicial Council
should study whether the Supreme Court should discard its
power to hear habeas corpus in the first instance, and whether
the voters would consent to such a repeal.
It is this writer's opinion that original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court over habeas corpus should be abolished. If
"habeas corpus" sounds too good to eliminate from the Con-
stitution, the next Convention might retain it only in the Bill
of Rights, where it should be stipulated that habeas corpus be
preserved as a civil right. The legislature could then vest it
in those courts as found necessary.
As an Appellate Writ. (2) In Ohio, habeas corpus is used
also as a means of appeal of litigation to the Supreme Court.
" Now in Art IV, sec. 5.
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The writ seeks to protect a person from unlawful restraint by
anyone; therefore, it will issue against any public officer who
holds a person pursuant to a void court process or judgment.
The habeas corpus proceeding is thus resolved into an appellate
or collateral attack on a proceeding of an inferior tribunal. The
question is whether the order which resulted in confinement of
the prisoner is void.
(a) Here the fog thickens, and justifies Professor Sunder-
land's contention that the appellate function of habeas corpus
be abolished. When habeas corpus issues, the prisoner walks
away a temporarily free man; under ordinary proceedings in
error, the prisoner may be detained to await a new trial. Hence,
to make the most sparing use of habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court has said that the writ will issue only where the proceed-
ings below were clearly "void"; but if the void character of the
order does not dearly appear on its face, or if the proceeding
was only "irregular," then the prisoner must resort to appeal.8
(b) As might be expected, the Ohio courts have faltered
in attempting to apply the distinction between "void" and
"irregular" proceedings. In Ex Parte Shaw,82 the Supreme
Court announced "jurisdiction" as the test of a void proceed-
ing; the writ would issue only if the court below did not have
"jurisdiction" of the subject matter or the parties. Thus,
habeas corpus may not be used to revise errors or irregularities
in the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction." Never-
theless, in Lewis v. Reed8 the Supreme Court ruled that a
petitioner may invoke habeas corpus to attack a judgment for
fraud in its procurement, even though the judgment may
appear on its face regular and made by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in its desire to limit the scope of
8" Yutze v. Copelan, l9 Ohio St. 171, 142 N.E. 33, 32 A.L.R. 1048
01923).
82 7 Ohio St. 81 (1857).
83 Ex Parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
84 117 Ohio St. I52 (1927).
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habeas corpus, might reasonably have allowed this remedy only
where the lower court has not yet reached judgment. If the
trial court has once reached a final decision, the defendant
might be relegated to the normal appeal. This is the distinction
the Supreme Court has drawn in applying prohibition. But not
so with habeas corpus. Of course the writ will issue to free a
suspect who has been confined to await action by the grand jury
and where the grand jury has adjourned without returning an
indictment."5 But as we have seen above, the Court allows
habeas corpus to strike down a "judgment" fraudulently pro-
cured even though the defendant might have prosecuted a
direct appeal.
(c) The Supreme Court does make a temporal distinction
-Is habeas corpus being sought before or after conviction by
the trial court?-in deciding whether habeas corpus may be
used to test the constitutionality of a statute. If the defendant
has been restrained, but not yet convicted, under the statute
alleged to be unconstitutional, he can bring habeas corpus, and
have the question of constitutionality of the statute decided by
the judge hearing the petition for the writ. On the other
hand, if the trial court has once ordered conviction upon the
basis of the statute, the defendant may not have habeas corpus,
but must test the validity of the law by an ordinary appeal."
This distinction appears irrational. A man's liberty is no less
important to him after conviction than before a conviction.
Both before and after judgment, the trial court is a court of
competent jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a
statute, without the need for an overlapping jurisdiction of an
appellate court in habeas corpus.
(d) Again, as a result of the restricted power of the Su-
preme Court in Art. IV, Sec. 2 in voting on the constitutionality
State ex rel.Parks v.Lott, 5 Ohio N.P. 4 69,5 Ohio D.N.P.6oo (1894).
s" Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio St. 417, 47 N.E. 5o, 6o Am. St. Rep.
753 (1897); Re Preston, 63 Ohio St. 428, 59 N.E. ioi, 8i Am. St. Rep.
642, 52 L.R.A. 523 (900).
87 Yutze v. Copelan, I9 Ohio St. 17I, 14z N.E. 33, 32 A.L.R. 1048
(1923); Ex Parte Elicker, i7 Ohio St. 5oo, 159 N.E. 478 (1927).
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of statutes, a resort to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in habeas corpus may produce inconsistent holdings as
to the validity of legislative acts. If this inconsistency is con-
sidered a defect in the Ohio constitutional system, it must be
borne as part of the price we pay for preserving habeas corpus
as an appellate writ.
(e) To allow the concurrent jurisdiction of the various
courts in habeas corpus enables the petitioner a choice of judges
before whom to commence his suit. Naturally, he will use this
advantage for self-serving ends: to seek a set of judges who
will be more sympathetic to his cause.
From a consideration of the above factors the writer believes
that the time has come for legal reformers to question whether
the Supreme Court should continue to have jurisdiction in
habeas corpus, in its original and in its appellate aspects.
(i) Since 1850 the number of courts (with power to issue the
hallowed writ) has so increased in Ohio that it no longer seems
necessary to order the Supreme Court judges to be available
to hear petitions in habeas corpus. (2) When used as an appel-
late writ in pending litigation, habeas corpus merely adds to
the overlapping and confusion which Professor Sunderland has
struck against. In its place, the uniform statutory appeal, in
its existing scope and in the extensions that I have advocated
under the previous discussion of mandamus and prohibition,
would perform -the same functions, and more effectively. To
guarantee a speedy hearing where a man is imprisoned, the
Supreme Court could give calendar preference to these cases.
SUMMARY
Should the above discussion be convincing, we may well
propose the following constitutional and statutory reforms:
(i) From Art. IV, Sec. 2 there should be repealed the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in quo warranto,
mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition. (At the same time
the original jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals in quo war-
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ranto, mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition should likewise
be erased.)" And the Ohio Judicial Council might consider
whether the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
Courts of Appeals in habeas corpus is desirable.
As protection against a reactionary court decision, the Con-
stitution should be amended specifically to empower the
General Assembly to regulate procedure on appeal.
(2) The legislature should direct the Courts of Common
Pleas to hear actions in quo warranto."
(3) The General Assembly can rephrase the uniform statu-
tory appeal"0 to include two new items: (c) appeal to order an
inferior tribunal to proceed, and (d) appeal to prohibit an
inferior tribunal from taking further action. And the legis-
lature can proxide that the relator shall not be ousted merely
because he has chosen the wrong writ.
cs OHIO CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, sec. 6: "The courts of appeals shall have
original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition
and procendo ......
The legislature has the power to do this under Art. IV, sec. 4 of the
Constitution.
0 OHIO GENERAL CODE, sec. J2223-I et se7.
